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This article analyses certain issues of 
implementation of Russian energy policy in 
the Baltic region from the geoeconomic per-
spective. The purpose of the study is to ex-
plain Russian energy policy in the region as 
dependent solely on the import capacity of its 
partners. Russian energy policy is viewed as 
one of the most important activities of the 
state and its business structures. As such it 
aims to achieve both general economic goals 
(generation of profit, market domination) and 
more specific geoeconomic tasks. At the same 
time, the policy follows the traditional rules 
of consumer/producer market game. Russian 
energy resources are delivered to an energy 
deficient region, where the demand and need 
for them is stable. The study is based on the 
author’s geoeconomic methodology, which 
extensively uses geographical and general 
scientific methods. This work aims to develop 
a geoeconomic paradigm in the framework of 
social geography. It will be of interest to 
anyone who aims to analyse the true motives 
behind Russian current energy policy. 
 
Key words: Russian energy policy, Baltic 
region, hydrocarbon resources, geoeconom-
ics, geoeconomics of energy sources 
 
The pipelines stretching across the 
territory of Russia help to connect unique 
mineral and raw material resources (in-
cluding hydrocarbon) and power generat-
ing capacities with their end users, i. e. 
industrial centres and other consumers in 
the pivotal geoeconomic centre, the 
European Union (EU). Because of the 
volume of its market (with population 
nearing 150 million people and a GDP of 
about 5 trillion USD) and its geographi-
cal proximity, the Baltic region has al-
ways been a point of special interest for 
Russia. The energy streams between Rus-
sia and the Baltic region are studied by 
applied geoeconomics. 
Geoeconomics, a research branch 
within the field of social geography, stud-
ies the formation of structural elements of 
global geoeconomic space [1; 2]. Such 
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elements are integrally involved in the implementation of Russian energy 
policy in the Baltic region, and they include (but not limited to) the follow-
ing entities: regional hydrocarbon and energy markets, global cities of the 
region, unique fields in the Russian Federation1, transnational and multina-
tional corporations (including OAO Gazprom and Transneft), companies 
within the production and service chains (Gazpromexport and Gazpromenft), 
largest international ports (Primorsk, Ust-Luga, etc.), transport infrastructure 
(a joint gas and oil distribution system), and so on. When looking through 
the geoeconomic lens on energy markets, one encounters the problems of re-
gional energy supply development. And from this perspective, geoeconom-
ics of energy sources becomes one of the priority study areas [3]. 
It seems that Russian energy policy is one of the pivotal activities of the 
state and its business structures oriented towards achieving the goals of both 
general economic (ensuring profit and securing a strong standing in the 
market) and geoeconomic nature (italics mine. — S. L.). 
Geoeconomic approach to Russian energy policy in the Baltic region 
rests on the following keystones: 1) identification of the role of energy pol-
icy within Russian foreign policy; 2) identification of the vector of energy 
policy and its main elements in the region. Following these steps can help 
assess the results of implementation of Russian energy policy in the Baltic 
region at all levels of territorial governance. 
 
Identification of the role of energy policy  
within Russia’s foreign economic policy 
 
It should be said about Russian energy policy in Europe in general and 
the Baltic region in particular that Russian energy resources are supplied to 
an energy deficient region, which shows stable demand. Table 1 demon-
strates that the most energy dependent countries are Germany, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, and Finland. 
 
Table 1 
 
Raw material and energy dependence breakdown for the Baltic region 
 
Energy dependence (2009) 
Country 
Total 
import 
(2010) 
Raw  
materials,  
including 
fuel import 
(2010) 
Import 
raw mate-
rials de-
pendence 
coefficient
Import background 
raw materials  
dependence coeffi-
cient as compared 
to the EU 
total oil gas 
Germany 502.93 55.71 0.11 0.73 61.6 95.2 87.9 
Denmark 45.14 1.99 0.04 0.27 
–18.8  
(inde-
pendent)
–55.2 
(inde-
pendent) 
–91.7 
(inde-
pendent) 
                                                     
1 The major gas fields have been heavily depleted. For example, the Urengoy field 
(operational since 1966) is depleted by 67 %, Yamburg (1969) by 46 %, Medvezhye 
(1967) by 78 %. As to other fields, their output is still at the initial levels. 
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End of table 1 
 
Energy dependence (2009) 
Country 
Total 
import 
(2010) 
Raw  
materials,  
including 
fuel import 
(2010) 
Import 
raw mate-
rials de-
pendence 
coefficient
Import background 
raw materials  
dependence coeffi-
cient as compared 
to the EU 
total oil gas 
Lithuania 9.99 5.38 0.54 3.60 51.2 90.1 100.4 
Latvia 6.71 0.70 0.10 0.67 58.8 99.4 114.1 
Poland 95.06 11.56 0.12 0.80 31.7 98.0 67.7 
Sweden 75.31 9.07 0.12 0.80 37.4 101.7 100.0 
Finland 33.30 8.47 0.25 1.67 54.4 98.6 100.0 
Estonia 7.38 0.66 0.09 0.60 21.2 64.3 100.0 
Regional 
total 775.82 93.54 0.12 0.80 … … … 
As com-
pared to 
the EU 
31.4 % 24.4 % … … … … … 
EU-27 
total, for 
reference 
only 
2468.83 
billion 
euros 
383.20 
billion eu-
ros 
0.15 1.00 53.9 83.5 64.2 
 
Calculated according to [4; 5]. 
 
The data clearly shows that all the countries of the region (except for 
Denmark) exhibit a critical level of gas dependence ranging from 67.7 to 
114.1, whereas their oil dependence varies from 64.3 to 101.7. 
Apart from these energy dependence indices, we have also studied the 
import and raw material import metrics of the Baltic region. It is worth not-
ing that, taken as a group, the Baltic Sea states demonstrate a lower import 
raw material dependence coefficient than the EU (0.11 and 0.15 respec-
tively). At the same time, the import of Lithuania and Finland is more raw 
material dependent, with indices of 0.54 and 0.25 respectively. With Finland 
this can be explained by the country’s strong dependence on Russian round 
wood; in case of Lithuania, however, the problem lies solely with energy re-
sources. 
Table 2 shows the indices of Russian energy import broken down for the 
Baltic States. One detail stands out, and it is a large gap between the countries 
concerned when it comes to volumes of import from the Russian Federation. 
Thus, with the EU total of 8 % and the Baltic regional total of 9 %, the indices 
of individual countries vary from 3 % (Denmark) to 88 % (Latvia). 
Such dramatic difference in numbers is explained, first of all, by the 
economic and geographical proximity of the region’s states to the Russian 
Federation, and by the long-established import corridors. 
Let us now consider the role of energy policy in the foreign economic 
policy of Russia and identify the major direction of energy policy, as well as 
its key elements in the region. 
S. Lachininsky 
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Table 2 
 
Import dependence of the Baltic region states  
on Russian energy supplies (2009) 
 
Import from Russia 
to total import, % Country 
Import  
from Russia, 
mln USD 
Import from 
Russia to  
total import, %
Oil import 
from Russia, 
mln tons oil gas 
Coal import 
from Russia, 
mln tons 
Germany 25.10 5 34.6 32 38 9.54 
Denmark 1.56 3 … … … 2.71 
Lithuania 3.57 36 8.3 no data 146 (re-export) 0.20 
Latvia 5.89 88 no data no data 100 0.13 
Poland 14.94 16 18.9 78 61 7.09 
Sweden 3.59 5 7.2 49 … 0.42 
Finland 12.70 38 9.6 95 100 4.69 
Estonia 1.72 23 no data no data 100 0.05 
Regional 
total 69.07 9 78.6 48 45 24.83 
 
Calculated according to [4—6]. 
 
In most countries of the world, energy policy is one of the key areas of 
the state’s foreign economic policy. Take, for example, the US economic 
policy in the Middle East from the 1970s all the way to 2000s, or something 
more contemporary, such as the Chinese economic policy in Africa. One of 
the leading producers of energy, Russia carries out its foreign economic and 
energy policies in the interest of national businesses. Thus, among the seven 
priority areas of Russian foreign economic strategy, number four is “an in-
crease in the role of Russia in ensuring global energy security and to ensure 
its strong position at the hydrocarbon market” [7]. The implementation of 
this priority requires the following mechanisms to be applied: 
— expansion and diversification of hydrocarbon export to the European 
market; 
— development of export of services relating to energy; increase in the 
share of highly processed products; 
— investment in foreign energy transportation and distribution system, 
also on the basis of mutual exchange of assets. 
The expansion and diversification of hydrocarbon export to the Euro-
pean market had an immediate effect on the Baltic region. In November 
2011, natural gas was first delivered from Russia to Germany through the 
first line of the Nord Stream pipeline with a capacity of 25.7 billion m3. 
A year later, a second line was put into operation. Annually, both lines can 
deliver 55 billion m3 of gas to Europe; and they are designed to last for at 
least 50 more years [8; 9]. Moreover, after the last compressor station of the 
Yamal—Europe pipeline had been launched the pipeline reached its planned 
capacity of 33 billion m3 per year [10]. 
It should be stressed that the introduction of new gas routes has only one 
purpose — to diversify export deliveries, so the same volume of gas can be 
 Energy policy 
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transmitted via different routes. One fact clearly illustrates the current situa-
tion: the gas transit system in Ukraine operates only at 65—75 % of its ca-
pacity, while that of Belorussia is almost fully engaged (85—90 % of capac-
ity) [11]. Table 3 shows that the new projects did not result in an increase in 
natural gas export from Russia in 2006—2012. 
 
Table 3 
 
Export of Russian gas into the Baltic region states, billion m3 
 
Country 2006 2008 2011 2012 
Germany 34.40 37.90 34.03 33.16 
Finland 4.90 4.80 4.19 3.48 
Poland 7.70 7.90 10.26 9.94 
Estonia 0.60 0.60 0.67 0.64 
Latvia 1.40 0.70 1.19 1.12 
Lithuania 2.80 2.80 3.41 3.30 
Denmark — — — 0.33 
Sweden no data no data no data no data 
Regional total 51.80 54.70 53.75 51.97 
 
Compiled according to [7; 11]. 
 
Similar processes take place within the oil industry. Russian oil export 
amounted to 242.2 mln t in 2011, which is 1.3 % less than in 2010. Diversi-
fication of major channels of oil export from Russia is also of significant in-
terest here. 
In 2000—2011, for a number of reasons detailed below, the channels of 
Russian oil export radically changed. Firstly, there was a 1.66 time increase 
in total oil export (from 127.5 to 212.3 mln t); secondly, we saw a significant 
increase in oil export via Russian seaports in the Baltics (up to 125.6 mln t) 
accompanied by a decrease in the volume of deliveries via the Druzhba pipe-
line by 14 %; finally, there was a dramatic (9.8 time) growth in transporta-
tion via new channels [13]. 
The role of new ports in the Baltics (Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Vysotsk) is 
strengthened through the construction of new pipelines, the first of which 
was the Baltic Pipeline System-1 based at the port of Primorsk (in 2010 the 
volume of export oil transhipment amounted to 70 mln t). Since March 2012, 
oil export has been carried out through the Baltic Pipeline System-2 with an 
export terminal at Ust-Luga (export oil transhipment reached 15 mln t in 
2012; a number thought to increase up to 18 mln t in 2013). 
Looking at the geography of Russian oil export, one will immediately 
notice that 93.3 % of all transactions happen via 3 European corridors: the 
northern (50.9 %), southern (22.5 %), and central (19.9 %) ones. For the Bal-
tic region, the northern corridor is of special importance. The corridor starts 
in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation (the ports of Arkhangelsk, Va-
randei and partially Primorsk and Ust-Luga), and goes via the German sector 
of the Druzhba oil pipeline. The end buyers are Germany and other coun-
S. Lachininsky 
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tries. The second — central — route follows the Druzhba pipeline. Its cus-
tomers include Poland and the countries of the former Visegrád Group. Both 
land and maritime shipping options are possible for the countries of the Bal-
tic region. 
As to the development of export of services relating to energy and an in-
crease in the share of highly processed products, one cannot but mention 
that the Rosatom government-owned corporation is constructing the Baltic 
Nuclear Power Plant in the Neman district of the Kaliningrad region in ac-
cordance with the decree of the Government of the RF No 1353-r of 
25.09.2009 [14]. 
The expected electrical power output of the BNPP is 8.5 billion kWh per 
year (current consumption level is estimated to be 4 billion kWh per year) 
[15]. Power surplus can be exported to the countries of the Baltic region 
(primarily Germany, Poland, and Lithuania). 
However, if the export scenario prevails, the geoeconomic significance 
of this project can become ambiguous. Some experts believe that ‘in the near 
future, the energy system of the Baltic countries will be integrated into the 
continental Europe’s energy system, ENTSO-E. The first steps in that direc-
tion have already been taken, namely, the projects Estlink (a set of HVDC 
submarine power cables between Estonia and Finland), LitPol Link 
(a planned electricity link between Lithuania and Poland), SwedLit 
(a planned submarine power cable between Lithuania and Sweden), and oth-
ers. A simultaneous integration of the Baltics into ENTSO-E will entail their 
secession from the IPS/UPS, which will inevitably affect Kaliningrad’ [ibid]. 
The securing of energy bridges between the Baltics and its large European 
neighbours is conducted in the framework of several major projects: the 
Swedish-Polish bridge SwePol (operational since 2000) and the Estlink-2 en-
ergy bridge between Finland and Estonia (under construction). In this case, 
geoeconomic risks increase exponentially, in particular, the risks of eco-
nomic and geopolitical types [for further details, see 1]. Internationalisation, 
threats to external communications and monofunctionality are perceived to 
be the top three challenges here. 
At the same time the export of electricity generated at a hi-tech NPP can 
contribute to the diversification of Russian energy export. It is worth noting 
that in 2011 only two countries of the Baltic region purchased electricity 
from Russia — namely, Finland (9.6 billion kWh or 42.2 % of total export) 
and Lithuania (5.5 billion kWh or 24.4 % of total electricity export) [16]. 
It is also important to understand that the Kaliningrad Baltic nuclear pro-
ject is implemented in a competitive environment, against the background of 
the construction of the Astravyets NPP in Belarus, the design of the Visagi-
nas NPP in Lithuania, as well as NPPs in Poland. 
The third mechanism that can be applied to ensure Russian leadership at the 
energy market is investment in foreign energy transportation and distribution 
system that can also be carried out on the basis of mutual exchange of assets. 
This seems to be of significant importance, especially with the imple-
mentation of the EU Third Energy Package (a regulation designed to split 
energy business according to principal activities). In Estonia, where OAO 
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Gazprom and its Latvian subsidiary Itera Latvia own 37.03 % and 9.99 % of 
shares of the gas distribution company Eesti Gaasm, the government tries to 
pressure the company into auctioning off its gas transmission facilities by 
2015. OAO Gazprom owns 37.1 % of shares of AB Lietuvos Dujos and 16 % 
of Itera Latvija. In Poland, OAO Gazprom controls 48 % of shares of the Eu-
ropolgaz company [11]. Virtual nationalisation of gas transmission assets 
(with minor variation) seems to be the shared chosen operational path for the 
governments of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Poland. 
 
The major vector of Russian energy policy  
and its key elements in the region 
 
The major vector of Russian energy policy in the Baltic region, as well 
as in Europe in general, is determined by the geoeconomic standing of the 
end buyer’s market. The uncontested leader in this tangle of relationships is 
Germany; a situation, one may add, with a strong echo of history, since Rus-
sia and Germany go a long way back in their economic partnership. Our cal-
culations show that Germany accounts for 60 % of raw material import of 
the Baltic region. Germany alone accounts for 36 % of the total Russian im-
port into the Baltic region states, 44 % of Russian oil import into the region, 
28 % of Russian coal import into the region, and 61 % of Russia’s total gas 
import. At the same time, Russian export accounts for only 5 % of German 
import. Therefore, the objective of other Baltic countries is not to curtail 
Russian export of energy resources, and it is definitely not to nationalize its 
assets, but rather to diversify the structure of import — and energy import in 
particular. What follows is that, for obvious reasons, Germany will remain 
the key reliable energy outlet for Russian companies. 
The second line of the Nord Stream pipeline, launched in 2012, and the Bal-
tic oil corridor stretching from Primorsk and Ust-Luga significantly augment 
this vector. The Nord Stream includes the following elements of Eurasian 
geoeconomic space: the Yuzhno-Russkoye field on the Yamal Peninsula, the 
port of Primorsk and the submarine gas pipeline section stretching to the city of 
Greifswald, from where gas is delivered to various regions of Europe. To the 
south of Germany — via the OPAL gas transmission system (470 km — 
360 billion m3 per year); to Olbernhau and further westward — via the NEL sys-
tem to Rehden, to then create a connection with the Dutch gas pipeline. It is 
worth noting that, according to the EU Third Energy Package, OAO Gazprom 
cannot control more than 50 % of OPAL capacities. The major shareholders of 
the OPAL pipeline are Wingas GmbH (80 %) and E. ON Ruhrgas AG (20 %) — 
virtually a joint venture of Gazprom and Wintershall GmbH. 
The completion from the Czech section of Gazelle (166 km) with a ca-
pacity of up to 30 billion m3 makes it possible to connect to the MEGAL 
pipeline with an access to eastern France, through which Russian gas is de-
livered to France. Thus, the national Nord Stream inlet and outlet connec-
tions are turned into geoeconomic trans-European corridors. 
As for the oil export, one can mention the Baltic Pipeline System-1 from 
Kharyaga to Primorsk and the Baltic Pipeline System-2 from Noyabrsk to 
S. Lachininsky 
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Ust-Luga via Unecha (the Bryansk region). Both projects deliver oil from 
the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation to Europe and North American 
markets (with a capacity of 80 mln t per year) bypassing the ports of the Bal-
tics Sea states and Ukraine. 
The possible laying of energy cables from the Baltic NPP to Germany 
parallel to the Nord Stream will create a reliable energy bridge between Rus-
sia and Germany and set up a foundation for comprehensive economic part-
nership based on an energy union. 
In conclusion, let us try to assess the results of Russian energy policy in 
the Baltic region at the upper, middle, and lower territorial levels within the 
context of implementing the top priority of foreign economic policy — an 
increase in Russia’s role in ensuring global energy security and the im-
provement of its standing in the hydrocarbon market. 
Firstly, Russia has succeeded in expanding and diversifying hydrocarbon 
supply to the EU, primarily to the German market, over a short period of 
time. However, no significant increase of either quality or market share took 
place. Moreover, an alternative gas route to European countries, including 
those of the Baltic region, has been constructed and launched. As Yuri Zver-
ev emphasises, ‘Russian energy policy in the Baltic region seeks to over-
come the limitations imposed by the energy transport infrastructure devel-
oped in the Soviet times’ [17]. 
Secondly, construction works continue at the Baltic NPP, and its launch 
will result in an increase in the share of highly processed products in the ex-
port structure. Yet the central issue of Russian energy policy in Europe and 
especially in the Baltic region lies in the limitations imposed on the expan-
sion of Russian energy companies by the EU Third Energy Package adopted 
in 2009. Key provisions of the package suggest the division of vertically in-
tegrated energy companies and limitations to investment from third coun-
tries. The document calls for finalizing the construction of a single EU elec-
tricity and gas market [for more detail, see 18]. In this case, there emerges a 
serious problem of investment in the energy transmission and distribution 
networks and projects developed by the individual states in the region. 
The Baltic region is a special interest area for different geopolitical and 
geoeconomic actors. Geoeconomics is based on the theoretical and methodo-
logical contributions of geopolitics. It is not a coincidence that the ‘founding fa-
thers’ of geoeconomics, Carlo Jean and Paolo Savona, define it as ‘economic 
geopolitics’ [20]. At the same time, one should keep in mind that the economic 
and political objectives of a state often do not match. Russian closest 
neighbours — Estonia, Latvia and Poland — are vivid examples of this. Their 
economic interests often fall victim to the political ambitions of their elites. 
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